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Environmental Implications of Eastern Enlargement: The End of Progressive EU 
Environmental Policy? 
 
Petr Jehlička and Andrew Tickle 
 
In the years immediately following the fall of the communist regime, Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) governments paid significant attention to environmental policy 
developments, both at home and abroad, as a consequence of domestic environmental 
mobilisation. However, after 1992 the nature of environmental policy reform changed. Legal 
and institutional change could no longer rely on its domestic base and instead policy 
development became a function of the ‘structural imperative’ of reform in CEE countries 
[Slocock, 1996]. In other words, reform was an unwelcome, but necessary part of EU 
environmental harmonisation. By the late 1990s, an overriding concern in CEE states was to 
minimise the impact of these EU reforms on economic growth and competitiveness. Thus, in 
contrast to the initial proactive approach to environmental policy, CEE countries have 
become passively compliant with EU requirements and a strictly national perspective in this 
policy arena has been eclipsed by EU hegemony. 
 
The ‘Europeanisation’ perspective of CEE national environmental policy has generally 
focused on the one-way process of CEE adaptation to EU requirements and on the 
management of this process by EU institutions, predominantly the European Commission. 
Most scholars, regardless of their analytical approach, conclude that enlargement will have 
an adverse effect on progressive EU environmental policy. In these considerations, the 
impact of eastern enlargement on the EU is seen as a function of EU-related variables such 
as its administrative and financial resources and strategies of their deployment in the 
process of CEE integration with the Union. A topdown mode of analysis is thus essentially 
maintained. However, little attention has so far been paid to the interests, preferences and 
priorities of CEE countries themselves. 
 
Using the four Visegrad countries (V4)1 as a case study, this study offers some preliminary 
observations on the possible implications of eastern enlargement for EU environmental 
policy from the applicant states’ perspective. To that end, 29 in-depth interviews were carried 
out with environmental policy experts in the V4 countries in 2000,2 supplemented by five 
interviews conducted at the end of 2000 and at the beginning of 2001 with experts from EU 
countries who have substantial experience with environmental policymaking in CEE 
candidate countries. 
 
We begin with a discussion of insights from the existing academic literature on the 
implications of eastern enlargement for future EU environmental policy. We then outline 
some of the theoretical difficulties in exploring future environmental policy implications of 
CEE accession to the EU. Primarily following Andersen’s and Liefferink’s [1997] approach to 
studying the influence of individual states on EU environmental policy, this study then 
presents the domestic and international policy activities of the V4 countries in the 1990s that 
may be indicative of their attitude towards future EU environmental policymaking. The 
ensuing sections provide an overview of the V4 states’ involvement in international 
environmental politics and present expert ideas of future strategies for the V4 countries in an 
enlarged EU. We conclude by discussing the extent to which the patterns revealed in this 
study challenge commonly held views of how eastern enlargement will impact on EU 
environmental policy. 
 
The Need for an Applicant States-Centred Approach 
Analyses of the environmental policy dimensions of eastern enlargement, by both West [e.g. 
Connolly et al., 1996; Slocock, 1999] and East European authors [e.g. Stehlík, 1998; 
Kerekes and Kiss, 1998; Zylicz and Holzinger, 2000] mainly focus on adaptation to the 
environmental acquis in a narrow ‘technical’ sense (namely, the effectiveness of the transfer 
of these norms to the domestic context). Other authors are more critical of the power 
relations between the EU and applicant states. Caddy [1997], for example, describes EU–
CEE relationships as ‘hierarchical imposition’ while Baker and Welsh [2000] emphasise the 
undemocratic character of the harmonisation process in contrast to previously positive 
impacts of environmental policy on legitimation and governance, both in the EU and in 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
Authors who discuss the implications of eastern enlargement for EU environmental policy 
commonly assume that the accession of CEEapplicant countries will lead to a ‘downward 
pressure on environmental policy’ [Baker, 2000]. Pellegrom [1997: 55] expresses this view 
when she suggests that, ‘within only a limited number of years, environmental policy will be 
subject to many more conservative positions than the progressive ones’. In a similar vein, 
Holzinger and Knoepfel [2000: 15] more recently have argued that: … 
 
CEECs do not have a tradition of strong environmental policy and in the future they will 
probably give economic development priority over stringent environmental policy. 
Hence, most of them will presumably join the group of environmental ‘laggards’ within 
the European Council of environment ministers. 
 
Much of the existing literature on enlargement is dominated by past and present debates on 
the Europeanisation of policy in candidate states (that is, the ‘top-down’ approach) and only 
rarely adopts an alternative perspective that focuses on the ways that enlargement will affect 
EU environmental policy. Those authors who do discuss the future implication of 
enlargement [Homeyer et al., 2000; Carius et al., 2000] pay only cursory attention to 
CEErelated variables other than the number and length of requested transition periods. CEE 
country strategies, priorities, resources and interests in the post accession period are 
accorded little attention within these analyses. In other words, most analysts consider the 
applicant countries as passive subjects of the EU’s governance in the post-accession period. 
This implies that their domestic base of environmental policy will be weak and incapable of 
transferring domestic environmental policy concepts to the EU level. 
 
Concurrently it is also assumed that the new member states will maintain a negative 
approach to progressive EU environmental policy after they join the Union. In practice, this 
would mean that they would either try to block the adoption of new legislation or press for 
lower standards. However, as Aguilar Fernandez [1997] points out, passivity in EU 
environmental policymaking can be ultimately disadvantageous for a given member state 
because if ‘leader’ states succeed with their policy proposal, passive states will still have to 
adopt new legislation in whose formulation they had little or no influence. Further the 
expectation that the accession of CEE countries will lead to the downward pressure on EU 
environmental policy is based on the assumption that the CEE states will coordinate their 
conservative stance not only among themselves but also with the current group of ‘laggards’. 
 
Other arguments qualify such conclusions and suggest instead the possibility of CEE 
countries taking a more progressive and proactive approach to EU environmental policy. As 
Homeyer [2001] suggests, despite unfavourable economic, administrative and political 
factors, there are incentives (for example, reducing EU-sourced transboundary pollutants, 
geographical and cultural proximity to ‘leader’ countries) for CEE countries to take an active 
part in EU environmental policymaking. Furthermore, there is the historical lesson of the UN-
based ‘Environment for Europe’ process that was instigated by CEE countries in 1991. 
There are also several specific pieces of legislation (for example, the Czech law on strategic 
environmental impact assessment or SEIA) adopted in the early 1990s that were more 
progressive than extant EU legislation. In addition, Thorhallsson [2000] argues that, despite 
their limited resources, smaller member states can be effective in pursuing their interests at 
the EU level owing to special features of their administration and the necessity to prioritise 
between sectors. 
 
Nonetheless, it is true that it is almost impossible to identify EU integration-related interests 
of CEE countries other than full membership in the Union. As Agh [1999] observes in the 
Hungarian case, this means there are still many non-articulated interests currently 
subsumed within the accession process with some potential for unpredictable outcomes. 
This lack of articulation clearly distorts the policymaking process. Our research provides 
abundant evidence that the environment is a prime example of such a policy area of non-
articulated interests. 
 
This study searches for evidence supporting an alternative view of the approach of V4 
countries to EU environmental policy, compared to the model of reactive and passive 
adaptation. We make the idealised assumption that once the current process of V4 countries 
environmental adaptation is concluded and these countries become full members, they will 
have an equal opportunity to follow their interests as other member states. We also assume 
that the European Commission’s high degree of influence on the candidates and its 
insistence on their full adoption of environmental acquis with only a limited number of 
transition periods will lead to a relatively high degree of harmonisation when CEE countries 
join the Union, thus considerably reducing the threat of re-nationalisation of environmental 
policy in the future. 
 
On this basis we formulate two sets of questions. The first set is: what is the domestic base 
of environmental policy in the V4 states? Are there signs indicating that in some areas of 
domestic environmental policy, the strategy of passive adaptation to the EU has an 
alternative, more proactive approach, either now or in the future? The second set of 
questions is: what capacity do the V4 states have to shape EU environmental policy? Are V4 
countries likely to pursue – at least in some areas – proactive environmental policy at the EU 
level? What is the likelihood that they will coordinate their efforts to slow down the 
development of EU environmental policy among themselves and with the group of 
‘laggards’? 
 
The Lack of Theory of National Integration 
When analysing the implications of eastern enlargement on EU environmental policy from 
the applicant states’ perspective, one is confronted with a paucity of suitable theoretical 
frameworks, viz.: 
 
Integration theory has focused on describing and explaining integration processes and 
the role of supra-national actors such as the Commission and the European 
Parliament. On the other hand, the role of the policies, interests and actions of its most 
important actors, the nation-states, has been neglected by theory; existing efforts are 
mainly empirical and a-theoretical, concentrating on national peculiarities rather than 
on establishing a theory of national integration policy [Petersen, 1998b: 87]. 
 
Thorhallsson [2000] also notes the neglect of smaller states and their impacts in international 
relations. He observes that the highest priority has been given to the study of the adaptive 
policy of small states in regard to the power politics of superpowers and not to the 
participation of small states in integration processes [Thorhallsson, 2000]. 
 
Elsewhere Petersen [1998a] formulates a general theory of national integration in the EU 
that is based on the premise of adaptation theory. This assumes that foreign policy consists 
of policymakers’ actions to manipulate the balance between their society and their external 
environment in order to secure an adequate functioning of societal structures in a situation of 
growing interdependence [Petersen, 1998a]. Depending on the balance between the degree 
of control over the external environment (influence capacity) and the degree of sensitivity to 
it (stress sensitivity) a state can pursue four types of integration strategies. The first is 
dominance (high influence capacity, low stress sensitivity), under which the state is able to 
make demands on partner states in the integration process without giving concessions in 
return. The second is policy of balance (high influence capacity and high stress sensitivity) 
that describes an ideal form of national integration strategy. The third is a policy of 
acquiescence (low influence capacity, high stress sensitivity), essentially a subordination of 
domestic priorities to external pressures and the fourth category is a policy of quiescence 
(both low influence capacity and stress sensitivity), which is typical for low-influence 
countries. 
 
Petersen’s typology enables us to make an initial assessment of the approach of V4 
countries to policymaking in an enlarged EU. In line with general expectations, it seems 
likely that, owing to their lack of both tangible resources (such as a strong economy and 
military power) and intangible resources (such as diplomatic skills, policy expertise and 
willpower) for influence capabilities, after accession, V4 countries will oscillate between 
acquiescence and quiescence. The former, which presupposes a limited degree of influence 
capability and high stress sensitivity, is typical for applicant states that make numerous 
concessions as they adapt their policies to membership. The latter indicates a preference for 
a low-participation strategy aimed at limiting concessions in the integration process. It is also 
a strategy of reduced commitment such as having loose ties to the integration process, 
perhaps with a concentration on particular goals or aspects. 
 
Thorhallsson’s [2000] analysis of smaller member states also suggests that in certain areas, 
even those with limited resources can exert an influence on the EU. Despite its different 
sectoral perspective (CAP and regional policy), Thorhallsson’s [2000] work on the behaviour 
of smaller states in EU integration is pertinent to this study as it provides a framework for 
consideration of the behaviour of CEE countries in the area of environmental policy. With the 
exception of Poland, the other V4 countries (and all other CEE countries invited to join the 
EU) fall into the category of smaller states. Thorhallsson’s [2000] argument is that small and 
large state integration behaviours differ owing to the size of their administrations, with small 
states not having sufficient capacity to address all negotiations owing to their lack of staff, 
expertise and other resources. As a consequence, while they behave reactively in most 
sectors they adopt proactive behaviours in the most important sectors. This is enabled by 
certain features of their administration such as informality, flexibility and greater room for 
their officials to manoeuvre. Owing to their smaller range of interests they tend, unlike the 
larger states, to prioritise between sectors. 
 
One of the few attempts to develop a more theoretical approach to the question of influence 
of member states on the EU, specifically in the area of environmental policy, is that of 
Andersen and Liefferink [1997]. Recognising the reciprocal nature of EU policymaking, they 
examine the domestic politics of environmental policymaking of different member states and 
analyse how links are made to Brussels’ politics. However, the applicability of this approach 
to CEE countries is subject to several limitations. First, their work is partly concerned with 
the ‘domestication’ of EU environmental policy in connection with countries that are already 
member states, although in the cases of Sweden, Austria and Finland they also analyse the 
pre-accession period of environmental policy. Second, the countries that were analysed are 
usually environmental policy ‘pioneers’ with highly developed domestic policies that they 
then seek to transfer to the EU level. In contrast, literature on the adaptation strategies of 
‘laggard’ countries’ to European environmental policy and their attempts to influence 
EU level is much rarer (but see Aguilar Fernandez [1997]). 
 
However, the concepts from which Andersen and Liefferink [1997] derived their analytical 
tool were developed neither specifically for the group of ‘pioneer’ countries, nor in fact for the 
purpose of EU studies. Thus, in the absence of a theoretical framework that would better 
match the dynamic discussed in this contribution, we loosely utilise their approach by 
analysing the past developments of V4 countries’ domestic environmental policymaking that 
may be indicative of their attitude to future EU environmental policy as well as the past 
record of V4 states’ international (extra-EU) environmental strategies. As the EU dimension 
of V4 states’ environmental policy is overwhelmingly defined by the goals of harmonisation 
and as instances of their own strategies are almost invariably ruled out, we therefore analyse 
areas of environmental foreign policy that were not constrained by the EU integration 
process. The future implications of V4 accession are then discussed on the basis of the 
Regional Environmental Center’s document summarising the suggestions of CEE countries 
for the 6th Environmental Action Programme [REC, 2000] and expert interviews conducted 
for this study. 
 
Domestic Factors Influencing V4 Countries’ Approach to EU 
Environmental Policy 
The enthusiasm of the immediate post-1989 environmental reform in V4 countries was partly 
a consequence of the role of environmental protests in overthrowing the previous regimes. In 
some cases this led to adoption of progressive environmental legislation that went further 
than the existing EU legislation, such as the SEIA legislation in the former Czechoslovakia. It 
is symptomatic that such legislation is now subject to ‘downward’ harmonisation. This is also 
a reflection of the view commonly held in V4 states that many environmental problems were 
resolved by the end of the 1990s. For instance, there is a considerable degree of 
complacency in the Czech Republic, particularly in local government and industry, with 
regard to reductions in air and water pollution during the last decade. The prevailing feeling 
is that ‘we have done too much for the environment’. 
 
The demise of the socialist system in CEE countries broadly coincided with what some 
describe as the culmination of the most significant shift in Western environmental 
governance over the last 30 years, characterised by Bernstein [2000] as the convergence of 
environmental and economic norms towards ‘liberal environmentalism’. This corresponded 
with pre-1989 domestic environmental (oppositional) discourse that stressed free markets 
and democracy as key conditions for successful environmental reform in V4 countries. 
‘Liberal environmentalism’ thus found a ready niche in V4 states shortly after 1989. 
 
Environmental Policy Actors 
Despite the significant role played by environmental mobilisation in the 1989 revolutions, for 
most of the 1990s V4 countries lacked powerful domestic actors in environmental politics. 
Within two years of the fall of the old regime, relatively strong green parties disappeared 
almost without trace [see Jehlička and Kostelecký, 1995]. Thus in V4 countries, 
environmentalgroups are now the main source of political and social communication about 
the environment. However, after more than a decade of activity, the existence of these 
groups is still critically dependent on external (that is, Western) financial assistance.3 Despite 
substantial foreign support aimed at the development of civil society, combined membership 
of environmental groups in V4 countries was, at the end of the 1990s, still lower than in the 
late 1980s. While a significant part of their funding is EU-based, environmental groups in V4 
countries have not showed much interest in EU environmental policy, mainly because the 
funding aimed to strengthen domestic capacity. Only recently has the availability of EU pre-
accession funds to V4 states started to generate some interest in EU environmental policy, 
although still related mainly to implementation issues. The scale of 
these activities is still national at best: 
 
We organised training for NGOs about EU integration, but our knowledge of integration 
is very weak … We organised it, but we also (were) listeners, as the others … Only (a) 
few speakers had the knowledge that we wanted. Their knowledge was also very 
narrow (Polish sustainability expert, interview 5 July 2000). 
 
Policy Structures and Networks 
According to experts interviewed in both V4 and EU countries, the most important (and often 
the only) environmental policy institution relevant to EU accession were the ministries of the 
environment and more specifically their departments of EU integration. The only exception 
seems to be Hungary, where a powerful prime minister’s office concentrates large 
competencies in the area of EU integration, including environmental policy. Elsewhere, 
departments of EU integration have a relatively short history and, compared to the scale of 
their task, an inadequately small staff.4 For instance, in 1997 only one person at the Czech 
Ministry of the Environment worked on environmental integration with the EU. Young people 
with knowledge of foreign languages, who in some cases have a background in 
environmental NGO activities, often staff these departments. Since their inception, their 
activity has quite understandably been limited to a passive adoption of the environmental 
acquis. None has developed a proactive policy agenda vis-a-vis the EU. 
 
This weak institutional base is clear evidence of state and EU failure to use the process of 
accession as a stimulus for strengthening indigenous policy structures. For example, a 
recent report blames the Czech central state authorities for the poor capacity within regional 
and local public authorities to harmonise legislation [GA&C and UK, 2001]. Homeyer [2001] 
also emphasises the European Commission’s overriding concern in the process of 
approximation with the formal requirements of transposing and legally implementing the 
environmental acquis and the relative neglect of administrative reforms needed for effective 
implementation and enforcement on the ground [see also Kružíková, this volume]. 
 
Given the weak position of environmental ministries within V4 governments, it comes as little 
surprise that ministries often used the process of approximation as a power enhancing tool 
by which they seek ‘to out manoeuvre rival ministries in a “two-level” game’ [Homeyer, 
2001]. Agh [1999] argues in a similar way when he maintains that ‘it is particularly true for 
Hungary that numerous interests are better represented in Brussels than in national capitals, 
first of all in the field of environmental protection’. This may also explain the rather uncritical 
acceptance of the existing environmental acquis by environmental policy communities in V4 
states. 
 
It seems likely that after accession, the ability of V4 countries to participate in Brussels’ 
environmental politics will be undermined by a lack of experts with appropriate training and 
experience. This prediction is based on three factors. The first is the past and current 
educational structure of V4 societies, which mainly emphasise narrow technical and 
scientific disciplines. This has serious consequences for the way in which environmental 
issues are understood by experts in V4 states: 
 
The root of the problem lies in [the] educational system. We lack people with an 
interdisciplinary background. We have specialists, but at the same time lack technically 
educated people and economists who would be concerned with the environment 
(interview, Polish sustainability expert, 5 July 2000). 
 
The second factor expected to limit post-accession participation in environmental politics is 
the scant attention paid in the 1990s by social and political elites to the environmental 
dimension of the approximation process. The third factor is the fact that EU assistance 
programmes aimed at strengthening V4 states’ environmental capacity have also neglected 
this area. Recent efforts by the EU to enhance the environmental policy capacity of the 
candidate states through various assistance programmes [see Carius et al., 2000] are 
invariably aimed at strengthening implementation per se, rather than wider policy thinking. 
As noted by one official, ‘[A] lot of the capacity building is being done on implementation 
issues and this is not the same thing’ (interview, British government official, 9 January 2001).  
 
EU environmental policy communities in V4 countries were described by respondents as 
small and closed groups of experts that developed on the basis of expertise applicable at the 
sub-national or national levels. This community is usually centred on a single personality 
who has a strong influence on the way in which the discourse on EU environmental policy 
develops. Thus, it seems that in Hungary and the Czech Republic, for instance, only one 
school of thought on EU environmental policy exists. This echoes recent suggestions that 
countries with centralised state structures and weak civil society tend to promote clientelistic 
relations that do not enhance social capital and thereby inhibit the capacity of networks for 
policy learning [Paraskevopoulos, 2001]. 
 
It does not seem likely that this situation could change significantly in the foreseeable future. 
At present, few institutions, whether research institutes, think-tanks or study and research 
programmes exist to address environmental policy research in V4 countries. Apart from the 
environmental component of a major Hungarian Academy of Sciences’ project researching 
the effects of EU integration on Hungary, no policy research programmes in V4 countries 
have been initiated. Existing environmental research institutes, such as those affiliated with 
the Czech Ministry of Environment, have an almost exclusively scientific and technical 
orientation. 
 
Policy Content 
Environmental policy in V4 countries did not start from scratch in 1990. For example, 
systems based on fees paid by polluters, national environmental quality standards and 
pollution permits were – to varying extents – in place in V4 states in the 1980s. In the 1990s 
however, virtually all newly introduced policy concepts and instruments were imported from 
the West. The majority of respondents believed that the environmental acquis meets the 
needs of their countries in terms of the most pressing environmental problems, particularly in 
the areas of water and air pollution and waste management. Most of them also consider 
implementation of the acquis by their countries as a major innovation in environmental 
policy. Horizontal legislation aimed at public participation and access to information is 
regarded as an important means of opening the political system to a wider spectrum of 
actors. There are only a few areas that are regarded as being more developed in candidate 
states than in the EU. These include the system of nature protection, and land use planning 
and SEIA procedures, although this varies, depending on which country is examined. 
 
By the mid-1990s, Caddy [1997] noted that the majority of CEE policymakers rejected 
wholesale the idea that pre-1989 policy was relevant within the framework of the EU–CEE 
policy dialogue. The interviews conducted for this study also confirmed little demand for an 
indigenous approach to environmental policy or for alternatives to EU concepts. In fact, most 
respondents see the current EU environmental policy model as optimal. Respondents were 
aware of some environmentally positive practices of V4 countries such as lower production 
of household waste per capita, recycling, wider use of public transport and, in some cases, 
less intensive forms of agriculture. These positive features were inherited from the socialist 
period. As such, they have mainly negative connotations, both for society at large and for 
most decision makers. Respondents were not aware of any domestic efforts aimed at their 
retention or even expansion. 
 
Furthermore, these features do not correspond with the traditional perception of 
environmental issues such as industrial pollution endangering human health that can be 
relatively easily resolved by clean-up programmes. As a consequence, these positive 
practices (such as glass bottle recycling) have been marginalised and replaced by other 
products (aluminium cans and plastic cartons) that are usually environmentally less 
beneficial [Gille, 2000; Gille, this volume]. However, international institutions shaping the 
development of environmental policy in the region have also neglected these features. 
Sometimes the consequences of their involvement in V4 countries are also environmentally 
questionable, such as EU infrastructure support for road building. Such issues were seldom 
discussed by V4 respondents. 
 
V4 International Environmental Strategies 
Despite the neglect of international environmental policy initiatives during the socialist 
period, at the beginning of the 1990s the V4 countries developed a relatively ambitious 
foreign environmental policy agenda, at both the European and global levels. The 
development of a foreign policy agenda signalled a significant break from the perception of 
environmental issues commonly held during the socialist period: 
 
[At the beginning of the 1990s] we realised how little we knew about global 
environmental issues, which we simply did not discuss during the socialist period, 
since until the end of the communist regime we were more interested in environmental 
issues at the local or national level (interview, Czech government official, 13 April 
2000). 
 
Partly as a response to this perspective, the initiative that led to the first ever set of pan-
European environmental strategies came from within the region itself [Vavroušek, 1993]. But 
this initially strong, proactive approach to global environmental politics largely came to an 
end with the ratification of the basket of global conventions signed at the Rio ‘Earth Summit’ 
in 1992. After the signing of association agreements with the EU (between 1991 and 1996), 
the focus of V4 countries’ international strategies shifted almost exclusively to the goal of EU 
harmonisation. In all four V4 countries this is underlined by the paucity of official documents 
on regional or global goals for the post-accession period. The dominant focus on the 
fulfilment of EU requirements has therefore led to the virtual abandonment of most other 
spheres of international environmental policy: 
 
I estimate that 95 per cent of the Czech Republic’s activity in foreign environmental 
policy is oriented to the EU, the remaining five per cent covers all the rest, including 
UNEP and UN conventions (interview, Czech government official, 6 January 2000). 
 
It is an irony then that even in the ‘Environment for Europe’ process, V4 states are now 
perceived as merely passive participants as described by a British government official: 
 
But there’s a bit of a problem in the Environment for Europe process which is meant to 
be a pan-European, west–east cooperation, as not enough of the initiative comes from 
the east and they don’t seem to set enough of the agenda as to what it is that they 
need (interview, British government official, 9 January 2001). 
 
Since the mid-1990s V4 states’ approach to global environmental regimes, most importantly 
to the climate change regime, has become fully dependent on the position of the EU. V4 
countries do not have defined goals for their activities in the field of foreign environmental 
policy other than membership in the EU. For instance, the Czech Ministry of the Environment 
has an annual plan of action at the international level, but it resembles a list of forthcoming 
events rather than a programmatic document setting out short-, mid- or long-term goals. 
Hungarian and Slovak respondents in particular emphasised that in areas of policy unrelated 
to the EU approximation, it is the personality and field of expertise of ministers of the 
environment that define the country’s activity at the international level. However, consistent 
with domestic policy, V4 environmental diplomacy is based in weak institutions and networks 
and relies instead on certain key individuals: 
 
There are occasional individual personalities [in CEE] who do have an influence in 
other international conventions, climate change, and sustainable development … but 
that is not the same as having a clearly defined foreign environmental policy … that is 
just the case of an individual who is having an effect in some fora or another 
(interview, British government official, 9 January 2001). 
 
Despite their similar history, common environmental problems, and the shared goal of EU 
membership, these have not prompted V4 countries to engage in systematic cooperation 
either in the area of global environmental agreements or in the process of approximation 
with the EU. The lack of mutual information about the process of harmonisation within the V4 
group and minimal contact between their experts is striking. With the growing distance from 
the fall of the socialist system and with the successes of some clean-up programmes, it 
seems that previously common problems are becoming less important. More diverse 
definitions of environmental problems are now emerging including, for example, differing 
attitudes within V4 countries to nuclear energy. Another example is Hungary’s preference for 
framing environmental problems in terms of water policy, for which the optimal unit of 
management is the Danube basin. Several Western experts also noticed a certain degree of 
rivalry among CEE countries during the approximation process. 
 
The pre-accession process was staged by the European Commission as a contest that 
promoted rivalry among the candidates. For instance, annual assessment reports on each 
candidate country’s progress in adopting and implementing the acquis and the publication of 
subsequent tables ranking the countries according to the number of concluded thematic 
‘chapters’ of negotiations fostered competition rather than coordination and cooperation 
among applicants. The purpose of the European Commission’s assistance was to enhance 
the compliance of individual candidates with EU demands, not to encourage them to take 
joint positions towards EU requirements or even develop joint proposals. 
 
Future Impact on EU Environmental Policy 
In the opinion of the interviewed experts from V4 states, the ideal future EU environmental 
policy should build on its current trends. In their view, the ultimate goal of an enlarged EU 
environmental policy should be sustainable development. The key mechanism for achieving 
this goal is integration of environmental and other public policies [see Homeyer, this volume]. 
The area in which this is most urgently desired is the interface between the environment and 
transport. EIA and strategic environmental assessment (SEA) are perceived as the most 
promising means of effective integration. Rather than command-and-control legislation, the 
type of policy preferred by the V4 countries relies on new policy instruments including market 
based instruments such as green taxes and horizontal legislation such as access to 
information and participation of civil society and economic actors. 
 
As Knill and Lenschow [2000] argue, new policy instruments assume a certain level of 
societal responsiveness and organisational mobilisation (supported by an appropriate 
resource level). Given the deeply unfavourable context for such policy styles in V4 states, 
including over-centralised state administrations and under-developed civil society, the 
seemingly unreserved acceptance of new modes of environmental governance by V4 states’ 
experts appears striking. We argue that this can be explained by two self-reinforcing factors. 
The first is the connotation of concepts such as flexibility, freedom of information and 
market-based instruments as a symbolic break from the oft-criticised socialist model of 
bureaucratic environmental regulation. The second is the hegemonic power of Western 
institutions over environmental transition in V4 states as virtually the sole source of 
environmental policy innovation. 
 
An analysis of the document synthesising the contribution of CEE countries to the 6th 
Environmental Action Programme [REC, 2000] corresponded closely with the views of the 
experts interviewed for this study, notably in the parallel advocacy of key concepts such as 
subsidiarity, adaptable policymaking, framework legislation and stakeholder involvement in 
response to the expected growing diversity of environmental problems. Despite this 
emphasis on a more flexible style of policy the document does not seem to confirm fears of 
the re-nationalisation of EU environmental policy resulting from eastern enlargement 
[Homeyer et al., 2000]. Rather, it is flexibility at the regional or sub-national level, rather than 
at the national level, which the document sees as crucial for effective implementation of EU 
legislation. Second, apparently disregarding the accession states’ failure in the past decade 
to take advantage of environmentally favourable features of CEE countries (mostly inherited 
from the pre-1989 period), the REC document suggests that applicant states’ accession to 
the EU offers an opportunity to enhance sectoral integration. Third, the strengthening of the 
effectiveness of current legislation should be given priority over the development of new 
legislation. Particular attention should be paid to the strengthening of institutions in CEE 
countries. Fourth, the experts who contributed to REC [2000] believe that actions at the local 
level, such as better planning and local action plans, are key policy concepts on the path to 
sustainable development. 
 
According to the experts interviewed for this study, possible innovative policy contributions in 
an enlarged EU could emerge in the areas of nature and landscape conservation and land 
use planning. This supports suggestions that the historic strength of networks in such policy 
areas can act as a buffer against asymmetric EU–CEE relations [Tickle, 2000]. Some 
respondents expressed an idea that the experience of harmonisation of CEE countries with 
stringent EU environmental directives may lead to more cost-effective approaches. However, 
these ideas did not go beyond general proposals, as the experts were unable to specify 
strategies and mechanisms by which they could be developed and promoted by V4 
countries with the prospect of future EU-wide application. 
 
The same holds true for some environmentally positive features of societies in V4 countries. 
Theoretically, all these features could become stimuli for innovations in EU environmental 
policy. Furthermore, these environmentally beneficial features of V4 societies could be best 
preserved and expanded through sectoral integration. However, despite being strong 
advocates of integration, none of the interviewed experts had suggestions as to how these 
positive features of V4 countries could be transformed into policy proposals applicable at the 
EU level. Instead, the experts tended to defer to the European Commission’s initiative in this 
respect. 
 
Most respondents did not expect active and innovative participation of V4 countries in the 
development of future environmental policy of the EU. There is clearly an absence of 
ambition concerning the post-accession period. Exhaustion from the demanding 
harmonisation process was indicated as the main reason. Another possible explanation was 
related to the lack of experience and will: 
 
The barrier is little knowledge of environmental policy. In Hungary nobody expects 
Hungary to be able to do something important on its own (interview, Hungarian 
environmental policy consultant, 28 June 2000). 
 
Among other reasons for the expected passivity and reactivity were the overriding priority 
ascribed to economic growth, a political culture that functions as a barrier for effective 
environmental integration, and also the ability of heavy industry to pursue vested interests. 
 
The interviews also addressed the theme of V4 states’ future alliance politics and revealed a 
fundamental discrepancy between the expectations of most Western commentators and the 
views of V4 country experts. First, contrary to Western analysts and apparently some 
southern European politicians [see Vinas, 2000], V4 experts unanimously ruled out alliances 
with south European EU countries in the Council of Environmental Ministers. Second, 
despite the declared similarities and shared interests among V4 countries, the experts did 
not reckon on coordination between them in the post-accession period. Third, all the 
respondents (V4 and Western) anticipated that a stable pattern of voting behaviour of V4 
countries in the Council of Ministers was unlikely to emerge. In their view, individual V4 
countries will behave in an ad hoc manner depending on specific opportunities and interests 
rather than on any systematic strategy. 
 
The marginal attraction of south European countries as allies is explained by their negligible 
involvement in the CEE transformation process, including its economic and environmental 
dimension as well as by minimal historic contacts between these two regions. Instead, if any 
discernible alliance pattern occurs, the respondents expect it to be generally oriented to 
north-western Europe states (such as The Netherlands and the Baltic states) and primarily to 
neighbouring countries such as Germany and Austria. This would likely stem from cultural 
and geographical proximity, from the intensity of current economic relations, and also from 
the environmental assistance of these countries to the V4 group. For example, throughout 
the 1990s it was Dutch and Danish styles and concepts that were cited most in terms of 
policy influence. 
 
Conclusion 
The December 2002 invitation extended to eight CEE countries to join the EU has initiated a 
new phase of interaction between the EU and the V4 countries. Post-accession, the strong 
leverage that the EU exerted on candidate states (hierarchical imposition) should recede and 
an altered set of relations may emerge in which the new member states will have more 
resources and political opportunities for pursuing their own interests and priorities. Thus it is 
now appropriate to try to identify the interests and priorities that may shape V4 states’ 
approach to EU environmental policy in the future. Most perspectives on eastern 
enlargement of the EU are based on a top-down perspective and an assumption that the 
current mode of asymmetrical relations will be maintained in the future. We have attempted 
to extend the scope of existing accounts by adding the applicant states’ perspective. 
 
We now examine whether this extension may lead to potential changes in the conclusions 
drawn by existing studies. For several reasons this is a complicated inquiry. First, the 
articulation of many domestic interests has been suppressed by the one-way process of 
approximation. This holds true for the environment, despite some limited evidence of 
proactive policy initiatives. Second, the future-oriented perspective inevitably renders our 
conclusions at least partly speculative. Third, a serious obstacle is a lack of an appropriate 
theoretical framework for such an inquiry. Integration theory has focused on describing and 
explaining integration processes from a topdown perspective focusing on the role of 
supranational actors. On the other hand, the role of the policies, interests and actions of its 
most important actors, the nation states, has been somewhat neglected. 
 
Despite initial evidence of a proactive approach to international environmental policy in the 
V4 countries, this model became quickly subsumed by the ‘hierarchical imposition’ of EU 
requirements, which has since become the dominant framework for the development of their 
domestic environmental policy. As a consequence, the preferred environmental policy 
outcomes in V4 countries correspond closely with the current trend in the EU towards 
flexibility, economic instruments, stakeholder participation and sectoral integration. 
 
Owing to the weak domestic base of environmental policy and the acceptance of EU 
environmental policy as a hegemonic model, it is highly unlikely that V4 states are, in the 
short term, capable of adopting a proactive approach to environmental policymaking at the 
EU level when they become full members. Based on our interview data, V4 policy experts 
neither expected nor required any major changes – based on indigenous experiences – to 
this model. The conditions of asymmetrical relations in which the transfer of the EU policy 
model took place have thus reduced the scope of policy considerations to the national and 
sub-national level. The strengthening of their environmental capacity – facilitated by various 
EU assistance programmes – has also centred on policy implementation at the domestic 
level, rather than enhancing V4 states’ ability to influence the EU. 
 
We also found that V4 states have not, and do not seem likely to coordinate their strategies 
– either among themselves or with environmentally ‘laggard’ member states. Instead, it 
appears that they would rather align themselves with the north-western ‘pioneer’ member 
states that have been most active in transferring environmental know-how and have made 
environmental policy discourse in V4 countries largely compatible with their policy models. 
Thus, we find that extant expectations about V4 states joining the current group of ‘laggards’ 
and putting a brake on development of EU progressive environmental policy may be 
premature and should be qualified. However, unknown variables and as yet unarticulated 
interests render such conclusions tentative. 
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NOTES 
1. The V4 comprise the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The term Visegrad 
refers to the location where the first summit meeting of the loose political alliance met in 
1991. In December 2002, all four countries were invited to join the European Union in 2004. 
2. Fifteen interviews were conducted in the Czech Republic, five in Hungary, four in Poland 
and five in Slovakia. Among interviewed experts were members of parliaments, former 
ministers of the environment, academics, NGO activists, civil servants and consultants. 
3. In 2000 85 per cent of the annual income of the most active Czech ‘new’ environmental 
group Hnutí DUHA came from foreign grant agencies or Czech foundations that distribute 
foreign funding. Membership fees made up only three per cent of the income [Hnutí DUHA, 
2000]. 
4. According to Wajda [2000], the Polish Ministry of the Environment is seriously 
understaffed with only some 300 staff members. In particular, there is a consistent lack of 
EU specialists. 
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